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‘TOO WELL-TRAVELLED’, NOT
WELL-FORMED? THE REFORM OF
‘CRIMINALITY INFORMATION
SHARING’ IN THE UK
The UK Supreme Court will eventually have to pass judgment
on the compliance of the legal and policy framework for
‘criminality information sharing’ with the stipulations of
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and
perhaps in relation to more than one area of practice within
public protection work. Parliament should recognise that there
is a groundswell of judicial (and academic) opinion which
suggests that, if the current legal framework regulating the
sharing of information for the purposes of public protection is
lawful, even in the face of criticism from the European Court
of Human Rights, then an intolerable level of uncertainty as to
the issue of that legality has now been reached.
This paper addresses the root causes of this legal uncer-
tainty, and argues for statutory reform to revisit even recent
tinkering with the law in this area. In an overview of both a
body of common law, in the form of a series of key decisions
from the courts, as well as the tensions between two tracts of
legislation, promoting public protection and human rights
values occasionally at odds with one another, this piece exam-
ines the crucial issue of the retention of criminality information
and the idea of individual (offender) consultation over its use
in public protection work.
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Introduction: The Issue of Stigmatisation
The Court of Appeal has recently scrutinised, and criticised, the
manner in which the criminal justice system can ‘silo’ informa-
tion about individuals and their past bad behaviour – convictions,
cautions, prosecutions and arrests, etc. – and how some of this
information is shared outside the criminal justice system,
e.g. with potential employers, even when that information is
relatively ‘historic’ or ‘trivial’ in terms of its currency or
seriousness.1
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The Supreme Court will perhaps offer up another indictment
of the way that the aims of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
1974 is frustrated in certain employment, or ‘public protection’,
contexts. Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, has gone so far as to
note (extra-judicially) that the government needs to ‘pull its
finger out and introduce legislation’ to address the way the
criminal justice system does nothing to address long-term,
inappropriate stigmatisation of some individuals.2 But how have
we reached such a controversial position from the courts?
This paper is an overview of the way that the law relating to
‘criminality information sharing’ (CIS) for public protection
purposes has developed in a piecemeal fashion. It is also a call
for systemic reform of the law in this arena of public responsibil-
ity. This is because unacceptable stigmatisation can result for
some individuals from the permanency of indefinitely retained
‘criminality information’ which is in reality only ‘quasi-
criminal’, such as the details of allegations of criminality, as well
as other peripheral categories.
Criminality information sharing in England and Wales is a
conflicted issue in need of a more certain and transparent legal
‘framework’ or ‘landscape’ (Thomas & Walport, 2008). The
competing interests are those of individual personal privacy (and
corresponding freedom from subjective privacy harms) (Calo,
2011) and the wider issues of public protection.3 It has been
acknowledged in sociological research that individuals try to
reduce their own levels of stigmatisation through deliberate steps
(Goffman, 1968).
The Context of Criminality Information Sharing (CIS)
Across Institutions in England and Wales
As well as the disclosure of criminal convictions and other
‘police intelligence’ stigmatising offenders in the employment
context, personal privacy issues arise from the processes of
personal information sharing across the criminal justice system
in England and Wales, which can involve information being
shared in prosecutions, for example where personal information
is used as evidence in criminal trials, potentially as items of
hearsay evidence4 and bad character evidence.5 Both hearsay
evidence and bad character evidence in criminal trials are
regulated by a codified statutory framework in the form of
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.6 This framework
has seen recent judicial approval, while in comparison the
framework for criminality information sharing has been much
criticised as unsubtle.7
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The courts have recently had many occasions on which to
scrutinise personal information sharing within a diverse array of
public authorities in the context of health and social care, as well
as other types of employers, by the police and other criminal
justice agencies8 in England and Wales.
This sharing takes place chiefly to further the aims of public
protection.9 Information sharing also occurs across the criminal
justice system in relation to the aims of probation organisa-
tions,10 and prison authorities, as well as a growing European
dimension to information sharing across criminal justice sys-
tems,11 including England and Wales.
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance uses
the idea of sharing ‘public protection information’ to represent a
professional and institutional ethos concerning public protection
for policing authorities.12
Indeed, Sir Ian Magee,13 has it that the timely and appro-
priate sharing of information about ‘risky’ individuals across and
outwith the criminal justice system creates ‘public protection
networks’ (PPNs) (Magee, 2008: 14). Magee also describes this
‘police intelligence’ as ‘criminality information’,14 though in the
light of the legal framework, which uses terms like ‘personal
data’15 and ‘sensitive personal data’,16 as well as ‘personal
information’,17 this is a further vagary of terminology, which
demonstrates a difference in attitude, perhaps, between lawyers’
approaches to criminality information sharing and those of
public protection professionals.
The Context of a Call for Reform of ‘Criminality
Information Sharing’
This paper is concerned with the extent to which the European
Convention on Human Rights requires the involvement of an
individual on a practicable basis when information about their
criminality, or alleged criminality, is being shared for public
protection purposes. Since the organisations that make up the
array of components within Magee’s ‘public protection net-
works’ (PPNs) (Magee, 2008: 14) are public authorities for the
purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, they must look to
uphold the ‘right to respect for private life’ possessed by
members of the public, which they are owed under Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. Gross LJ has
observed that ‘Art. 8 is now a well-travelled area of our law,
perhaps too well-travelled’18 – but this well-travelled road has
not brought the process of CIS to a place of clarity.
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The law is unclear and recent statutory reforms have failed to
add clarity to the law on the issue of individual consultation.
ACPO’s recommended ‘checklist’ approach in CIS decision-
making (ACPO, 2010b) laid out in their guidance, which is
followed by senior police officers in justifying the decisions they
take to share ‘criminality information’, features assumptions
about the identity of an individual as an ‘offender’, but recent
cases heard in the High Court and Court of Appeal have featured
the sharing of allegations, not convictions, in contexts that are
then highly stigmatising for individuals seeking or trying to
retain employment in sensitive arenas such as childcare, health-
care, education and social care, etc.19
Regardless of the terminology used in relation to ‘criminality
information’ or ‘intelligence’ sharing, or the exact decision-
making process concerned in a particular case of information
sharing, there is a consistent and considerable stigma which may
be attached to those individuals about whom the information is
shared in an ‘employability’ context. The individual may per-
haps not even have been charged with particularly stigmatising
offences, let alone tried for or convicted of them. From an
individualistic, ‘rights-based’ view, such as that required by the
Human Rights Act 1998, as opposed to a purely societal one, this
raises considerable (legal) difficulties.
For example, we can look to the case of R (W) v Chief
Constable of Warwickshire Police [2012] EWHC 406 (Admin)
for the sort of circumstance concerned. This case involved a
school teacher of ‘considerable experience’ seeking work as a
supply teacher, who will be effectively unemployable with a
number of unproven serious allegations concerning his conduct
recorded on the Police National Database – given their inclusion
by a police authority on the Enhanced Criminal Record Certifi-
cate he needs to present as effectively ‘clean’ in order to find
employment as a schoolteacher.20 In dismissing the claim
brought by W, having found that the decision to disclose the
serious allegations in the ECRC had struck the right balance,
Judge Gilbart QC did note that:
one must consider the serious effect which disclosure has
upon his prospects of obtaining employment as a teacher of
children, which should not be underestimated. I have no
doubt that it has had a serious effect on him to pursue his
career, not least because teaching was his chosen vocation.
Disclosure does not prevent him obtaining employment, nor
from obtaining employment in education, but it will prevent
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him from doing so in situations where children or vulnerable
adults are involved, and that may effectively exclude him
from anything but adult education.21
But there are cases brought where allegations, and convictions,
for far less serious incidents, relatively speaking, are denying
people employment connected to their ‘vocation’ in a way that
the Court of Appeal has now recently deemed unlawful.22
State Surveillance, Databases and Public Protection
Dr Lindsay Clutterbuck has outlined the way that developing
new intelligence gathering techniques within the Metropolitan
Police was a 19th-century reaction to a threat, perceived or
otherwise, posed by Irish nationalist extremists and other terror-
ist organisations of the day (Clutterbuck, 2002: 242–244).
Today, electronic governance and ‘dataveillance’ (Clarke, 1988)
depend on the effective deployment of information technology
systems across operational organisations, boundaries and even
legal jurisdictions.23
The Police National Computer (PNC) and the Violent and
Sexual Offenders Register (ViSOR) are two examples of multi-
databases which are used operationally to provide ‘police intelli-
gence’ on individuals that is used to affect decision-making that
concerns those individuals, chiefly in the detection, investigation,
prosecution and punishment of crimes, as well as parole and
probation practices and decisions, and the wider employment
vetting context (Pitt-Payne, 2009). Further, some databases, and
risk assessment software that draws on databases, form part of
the wider criminal justice e-governance context (for example, the
Electronic Offender Assessment System, or e-OASys,24 is used
to ‘process’ ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ in a
human rights-sensitive probationary context).
Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs) are, by the
measure of the number of judicial review cases which target
them as a disclosure method, the most contested instances of
personal information sharing in the sense of the work of the
criminal justice system (Pitt-Payne, 2009) and, specifically, the
role of the police in divulging information to employers and
volunteering co-ordinators in the vetting process, where children
and vulnerable adults must be ‘safeguarded’.
Timothy Pitt-Payne tells us that CIS may involve:
information about acquittals, or allegations that have never
been the subject of the trial, or even about matters other than
allegations of criminal conduct . . . In 2008-09, a total of
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274,877 enhanced disclosures were given; and 21,045 of
them disclosed soft intelligence (Pitt-Payne, 2009).
Kennedy LJ in Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police
[1999] 3 All ER 604 asked how tensions between respect for
private life, the issue of stigmatisation, and the importance of
public protection as a policy issue might be resolved, noting:
Even if there is no request from the regulatory body, it seems
to me that if the police come into possession of confidential
information which, in their reasonable view, in the interests
of public health or safety, should be considered by a pro-
fessional or regulatory body, then the police are free to pass
that information to the relevant regulatory body for its
consideration.25
For those individuals about whom stigmatising criminality infor-
mation is shared, though, the law today,is both reassuringly and
perplexingly more complex.
A key consideration in this issue, from the perspective of the
individual, is the existence of the right to respect for private and
family life contained in Art. 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (1950),26 and the interpretive jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
This set of Europeanised, and Europeanising, privacy values
has effect in UK law through the provisions of the Human Rights
Act 1998, though the Human Rights Act 1998 will potentially be
amended by a UK Bill of Rights27 – perhaps losing some of the
linking and ‘interpretive’ role between the courts in the UK and
the European Convention on Human Rights, and hence Article 8
of the ECHR and the right to respect for a private life, as well as
Strasbourg jurisprudence on privacy issues.28
As for the issue of criminal records stigmatising convicted
offenders, the former Minister for Justice, Ken Clarke, has
announced proposed reforms to the Rehabilitation of Offenders
Act 1974 framework – generally looking to reduce the time
offenders must declare their criminal convictions as unspent,
although not with regard to offenders who were imprisoned for
lengthier prison sentences, starting at the level of four years’
imprisonment (Travis & Bowcott, 2012). The legal context to
personal information (or ‘personal data’) sharing across the
public sector, just as across the private sector, is also regulated
by the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
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The notion of confidentiality and the legal action, or tort,
known as the ‘misuse of private information’, as well as the
doctrines of defamation, are grounds used to broadly protect
personal privacy that have evolved in our courts. Suffice to say
that when a public authority sharing information as part of a
‘PPN’ looks to its duties under statute, then these wider legal
concerns fall away in circumstances where the public authority
has shared personal information across the public sector. Such is
the authority of statutory provisions when considered as legal
duties or powers that further the aim of public protection.
Importantly, there is a ‘public interest’ type of defence available
with regard to any actions for breach of confidence, and the
courts will always look to the common law police power to share
information on the basis of a ‘pressing need’ even when there
might be said to be a breach of confidentiality involved, given a
situation of sufficient gravity.29 The Court of Appeal has noted
the impossibility of extending a tortious duty of care to the CIS
process conducted by police authorities on a public policy
basis.30
One pertinent example of the different qualities of ‘criminal-
ity information’ versus more general ‘police intelligence’ is the
operation of s. 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which
enables public authorities to share personal information with the
police or another body, such as a local authority, when it is
requested in connection with an application for an anti-social
behaviour order.31 With regard to what can more certainly be
described as ‘criminality information’ rather than mere ‘police
intelligence’, specific statutory provisions in relation personal
information sharing for criminal justice purposes in England and
Wales includes those that underpin the Child Sex Offender
Disclosure Scheme (Criminal Justice Act 2003 s. 327A).32
The Police Act 1997 as amended, for example, includes
provisions in s. 113B that govern the use of ‘police intelligence’,
also known as ‘soft intelligence’, by police authorities in disclos-
ing personal information as part of the compilation of Enhanced
Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs). This process is then
governed by which information is ‘relevant’ to a particular
employment vetting scenario and a consideration of what ‘ought
to be included’ in an ECRC. Given the nature of this dual test as
one based on both factual relevancy and a consideration of what
is proportionate to disclose, and in the light of the extreme
sensitivity of the ‘soft intelligence’ concerned, it is no surprise
that the interpretations of these provisions by police authorities
has been regularly contested in the courts.
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A Critical Analysis of the Law of ‘Criminality Information
Sharing’
The key right, freedom or legitimate interest at stake, since we
are concerned with personal information sharing by a public
authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, is the
Art. 8 ECHR right to respect for private life enjoyed by every
data subject when their personal data is shared, as acknowledged
by the leading case of R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3. The right to respect for private life
is ‘engaged’ by the sharing itself, and will be unlawfully
‘infringed’ (entailing an actionable breach of Human Rights Act
1998 s. 6(1)) unless that infringement is legitimate, propor-
tionate and necessary in a democratic society.
Plainly, the sharing of personal data with the kinds of
criminal justice, taxation and immigration agencies envisaged by
the scope of this report is necessary in a democratic society – the
Magee Report, as noted above, spoke in 2008 of the creation in
the UK information society of ‘Public Protection Networks’ and
emphasised their importance in safeguarding the public (Magee,
2008: 14).
The Data Protection Act 1998, with its implied powers to
share information for public authorities, ensures a public author-
ity is plainly acting legitimately as long as it accounts for the
second schedule processing rule in relation to non-consensual
sharing in terms of public protection responsibilities and interests
in the avoidance of harm – which brings us to the notion of
sharing information proportionately.
Proportionality or the lack thereof is a ground of judicial
review of the actions and decisions of UK public authorities. It
relies as a test of lawfulness on a measurement of the balancing
exercise the relevant public authority has undertaken when
deliberating the impact and harms on an individual or group of
individuals when taking some action or decision with a particular
motivation or purpose. L is a superb example of how this
balancing exercise must be free of presumptions. It cannot be
said, following L, that the safeguarding of children or vulnerable
adults is a priority over the right to respect for private life an
individual enjoys. Each potential personal data sharing decision
must be analysed on its merits. To this end, the factual relevancy
of the personal data that may be shared to the aims and outcomes
of that sharing must be fully and demonstrably taken into
account in any kind of ‘checklist’ approach to decision-making,
as noted above. ‘Relevancy’ then, as a key notion within a test
for proportionality, does not exist solely as a single leg of the
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dual test in s. 113B of the Police Act 1997 in the ECRC ‘soft
intelligence’ context, but in all personal information sharing
contexts connected with the criminal justice system in England
and Wales.
R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2009]
UKSC 3 is the leading case in the area of ‘criminality informa-
tion’ sharing (CIS) across the public sector, and emphasises that
a truly balanced approach to decision-making must be taken to
accord with the notion of proportionality, since Art. 8 ECHR
rights of data subjects are engaged in this situation. There is also
a requirement in the common law, now stemming from this
leading precedent, that the subject of what we can term ‘crim-
inality information’ be consulted where appropriate before
information is shared.33
H & L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 demonstrates
that the approach to sharing personal data in a context which
sees Art. 8 ECHR rights engaged must be fair, balanced and
proportionate. H & L was a case involving the proactive sharing
by a local authority of information relating to criminal convic-
tions – and in this case the Court of Appeal held that this
required that the local authority in sharing the information
should have sought to consult the data subject, H, before the
sharing took place. However, in this case there was an acknowl-
edged lack of factual relevance in the sharing of the sensitive
personal data (i.e. no link between the role H was involved in
and the nature of his convictions), and the case involved the
proactive information sharing context, making consultation prac-
tically more feasible.
Lord Kennedy noted the importance of the consultation of
the individual about whom the criminality information may be
shared, saying: ‘Obviously in each case a balance has to be
struck between competing public interests, and at least arguably
in some cases the reasonableness of the police view [with
regard to the disclosure of the information] may be open to
challenge.’34
In the contemporary context, Lord Munby gave an excellent
summation of Article 8’s procedural requirements in H & L,
noting that in information sharing cases there are: ‘standards of
procedural fairness mandated in circumstances such as this both
by the common law and by Article 8’.35
Further, it could be implied that, in the context of sharing
‘personal data’, where the second schedule processing rules in
the Data Protection Act 1998 (still of key concern in the s. 29
exemption for ‘crime and taxation’ context) include specific
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consent-based processing options such as contractual agreements
etc., as well as the additional option of processing (here, ‘shar-
ing’) personal data because it is necessary to protect the vital
interests of the ‘data subject’ – or necessary given the legitimate
interests of the third party with which the personal data is shared
(e.g. the police), though never where the processing is ‘unwar-
ranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights
and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject’ – that
some processing and therefore sharing of personal data will be
non-consensual and therefore occur without consulting the data
subject concerned.36 Of course, ‘proportionality’ will still be a
vital factor in this rationale for non-consensual disclosure, given
the ‘interpretive’ provisions of s. 3 of the Human Rights Act
1998, where in our particular information sharing contexts Art. 8
ECHR rights are engaged and therefore ‘read into’ statutory
provisions by the UK courts.37
In terms of more ‘organic’ criminality information sharing,
away from the ECRC context, the case of R (A) v B [2010]
EWHC 2361 (Admin) shows that it is unlawful for the police to
share information with the employers of an individual, outside
the ECRC process, where there is no evidence of a criminal act
by the individual, only evidence of unusual (non-criminal)
sexual behaviour. This case would suggest that the public
authorities should only share evidence of particular offences/
convictions where this would be done to protect the ‘vital
interests’ of another person, in the safeguarding/public protection
sense, rather than simply morally questionable behaviour. The
Court of Appeal case of R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice &
Another [2011] EWCA Civ 175 showed that some allegations
will be relevant in sharing information to protect the public/
safeguard children or vulnerable people, though again, pro-
portionality is key. Proportionality and factual relevancy, as
mentioned above, are the two legal tests from s. 113B of the
Police Act 1997, the statutory provisions relevant in C since this
is a ‘soft intelligence’ case involving the ECRC process. The
emphasis on the core issue of ‘proportionality’ is unmistakable.
The requirement of consultation with subjects of ‘criminality
information’ before the information itself is shared is thus an
emerging requirement in the common law.
But, according to Wilson LJ we needn’t be too concerned ‘on
behalf of Chief Constables’ as the common law ‘suggests the
impracticability of any substantial degree of consultation
between Chief Constables and applicants prior to issue of
[Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates]’ since this requires
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only, in Wilson LJ’s view, ‘a degree of consultation’38 per
Neuberger LJ in R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the
Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3 at para. 82.
Munby LJ highlights the key issue however, saying: ‘Article
8 . . . has an important procedural component.’39
The issue then is that there is no specific statutory guidance,
or rather express statutory language, as to what an appropriate
degree of consultation, to satisfy the proportionality requirement
in CIS, might be in particular circumstances – and this is perhaps
where statutory codification, or better, perhaps, a truly high
degree of statutory specificity and protection of individuals’
procedural rights to consultation, would be of real and mean-
ingful assistance to Chief Constables and others responsible
for the sharing of ‘criminality information’ across the public
sector.
It is argued that there is only some limited procedural
protection from severe stigmatisation in employment and other
contexts because of a requirement of consultation with regard to
the disclosure of unproven allegation and other ‘soft intelligence’
about individuals.40
In the UKSC decision in L, it seems that Lord Neuberger (at
para. 76) makes a distinction between ‘public’ criminality
information, such as conviction data, and ‘soft’ or ‘police’
‘intelligence’, which is best regarded as ‘public protection
information’. Lord Neuberger then notes that: ‘Whether as a
result of a conviction or a caution (which involves the person
concerned having admitted committing the offence in question),
there can be little doubt that the information in question will be
accurate, and will have been sufficiently grave as to amount to
a crime.’41
Following binding precedent set in L, Kenneth Parker J in R
(Thomas) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police
[2012] EWHC 147 (Admin) says (at para. 47), in relation to the
lack of discretion with regard to ‘blanket’ sharing convictions
and cautions or warnings in an Enhanced Criminal Records
Certificate (ECRC) under provisions of the Police Act 1997, that
if he ‘had not been so constrained’ he ‘would have found that the
present system that allows no exceptions and provides no mech-
anism for review was disproportionate and not compatible with
Article 8 . . .’42
In his judgment Kenneth Parker J also notes the impact of the
Five Forces43 decision in enabling the indefinite retention of
convictions, cautions or warnings, and other categories of
‘unproven’ criminality information.44 Kenneth Parker J also
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notes the calls made by Sunita Mason and others in relation to
introducing a potentially more complex screening approach,
which would then entail a less stigmatising approach for use by
the public protection networks concerned with CIS.45
Kenneth Parker J’s comments in obiter though (at para. 35)
are enlightened, and enlightening, as he said: ‘A system that
permitted exceptions would probably be more prone to error, but
only marginally so if the criteria for review were themselves
conservative and risk averse. The consequential improvement to
the protection of Article 8 rights, on the other hand, would be
likely to be substantial.’46
Even with Kenneth Parker J giving permission to appeal to
the unsuccessful applicant, Thomas, it is expected that we will
see the kind of non-result demonstrated in R (GC & C) v
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21,
concerning the lawfulness of the indefinite retention of informa-
tion on the National DNA Database, where statutory provisions
could not be successfully challenged, given the important doc-
trinal effect of Parliamentary sovereignty, though statutory guid-
ance can be deemed unlawful and incompatible with Art. 8
ECHR, as it was in GC & C.47
The Questionable Impact of the Protection of Freedoms
Act 2012
The relevant reforming provisions of the Protection of Freedoms
Act 2012 have recently been brought into force, but are not the
final word in the debate over the appropriateness of a consulta-
tion requirement in the criminality information sharing (CIS)
process.
There has been no introduction of an exclusionary principle
relating to information based on the increasing age or relative
triviality of information such as a ‘spent’ conviction, a more
minor offence by category such as property or dishonesty-type
offences (rather than violent or dishonesty offences), or cautions,
warnings or even unproven allegations or unsuccessful prosecu-
tions as ‘soft intelligence’ (which would still remain the concern
of Kenneth Parker J in T, as above, therefore).
So our general conclusion, as above, is that there is a general
duty to consult where practicable on an authority like a police
body engaged in CIS, even through the ECRC creation process,
because of developments in the common law under the influence
of Art. 8 ECHR.
However, s. 79 PoFA 2012 abolishes the requirement for an
ECRC to be sent to the ‘registered person’. So the ECRC will
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first be sent only to the individual it describes, rather than
simultaneously to their prospective employer. An individual can
then apply to an independent monitor for a review of the content
of the ECRC as to the relevance of the information therein, and
whether it ought to have been included (Police Act 1997 s. 117A
as amended by PoFA 2012 s. 82).
The independent monitor must then ask the chief officer of
the relevant police authority to review the stance they had on
the relevance of the information, and whether it ought to have
been included (Police Act 1997 s. 117A as amended by PoFA
2012 s. 82).
When this new process is inevitably tested in the courts, how
will the common law consultation requirement created by the
courts drawing on Art. 8 ECHR be seen in the light of these
statutory reforms? This author suggests there are numerous ways
to imply consultation or notification duties on policing author-
ities as possible options for a figurative High Court judge to
consider in relation to the operation of the new statutory process.
However, the most sensible in terms of practicality, efficacy and
Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 6 ECHR compliance might be to place a
consultation duty on the Independent Monitor at the ECRC
review stage, and a separate requirement to consult on the police
at the ECRC creation stage, and a duty on the police only to
ensure the ‘giving of reasons’ at the ECRC review stage.
It remains to be seen how ACPO and statutory guidance on
CIS will be amended in the light of the new statutory framework
with regard to the creation, and now review, of ECRCs.
Remedying a Breach of Procedural Art. 8 ECHR Rights in
Retrospect?
In the case of Regina (Royal College of Nursing and others) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 2761
(Admin), Wyn Williams J determined that a lack of prompt
individual consultation in the barring process relating to indi-
viduals perceived as a risk to the public in the nursing pro-
fessions was a breach of Art. 6 ECHR and potentially Art. 8
ECHR rights under the HRA 1998. Wyn Williams J suggested
that:
I consider that it is the (often irreversible) detrimental effect
of the inclusion in the list that makes the breach of Article 6
at the first stage of the process incurable by any of the
measures later in the process which are designed to afford
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a sufficiency of procedural protection to the person
concerned.48
But in some CIS cases, such as R (B) v The Chief Constable of
Derbyshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC 2362 (Admin), there
can be an acknowledgment from the judge in their ratio that
procedural rights of consultation, afforded by the HRA 1998 and
developed in the common law, can be breached but then also
protected by some form of ‘consultation in retrospect’, or the
recording of protest at the CIS process, though ultimately this is
not something of great importance given the judge’s ultimate
aim of upholding the legitimacy of a decision to share criminal-
ity information in order to protect the public.
It remains to be seen exactly how the kind of statutory
provisions argued for here could be enacted, and how the courts
might interpret these new practices, but there are still remaining
concerns over the lack of genuine limiting principle on dis-
closure of criminal records, and the lack of an express statutory
consultation requirement on police authorities.
The Issue of the Indefinite Retention of ‘Criminality
Information’
In the Court of Appeal decision known as Five Forces,49 five
Chief Constables succeeded in arguing that the model of indefin-
itely retaining conviction data and ‘soft intelligence’ on the
Police National was lawful despite arguments as to the curtail-
ment of data protection rights and the human right to a private
life. The Information Commissioner was unsuccessful in estab-
lishing that an earlier decision of the Information Tribunal was
correct in declaring the PNC operation unlawful because of the
indefinite retention of personal data of the most sensitive kind,
known commonly and variously as ‘criminal records’, ‘criminal-
ity information’, ‘police intelligence’ or ‘conviction data’.
According to the Court of Appeal, the legislative basis of the
national records system was such that the Data Protection Act
1998 and its interaction with other statutes enabling police
‘operational purposes’ afforded the notion of lawful operation to
this system. Furthermore, the Court found that Article 8 of the
European Court of Human Rights was not engaged with respect
to the indefinite retention of the records concerned.50
This point as to the (non-) engagement of Art. 8 ECHR rights
through the retention of criminality information on a database of
some kind is supported in R (Catt) v Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis [2012] EWHC 1471 (Admin).
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In that more recent case, Gross LJ, in refusing the application
for judicial review brought by the claimant, determined that it
was possible to distinguish the retention of text-based informa-
tion, namely the personal data describing Catt, recorded by
police officers attending an anti-armaments industry protest,
from the retention of photographs of protestors taken covertly by
plain-clothes police officers, as in Wood.51 In Catt, Gross LJ was
adamant that the retention of data recorded about a public event
might comprise personal data for the purposes of the Data
Protection Act 1998, but that its indefinite retention was allowed
for by s.29 of the DPA, and that Art. 8 ECHR was not engaged
by that indefinite retention, since the event was indeed public
and the data gathered using visible policing methods, i.e. overt
surveillance of a demonstration or protest. Gross LJ was also
certain that if it could be said Art. 8 ECHR was engaged by the
indefinite retention of such material on the databases of the
National Domestic Extremism Unit, this retention was justified
by the fact that the organising group which motivated the protest
was one which included individuals who had committed criminal
offences at protests and demonstrations, and thus the retention of
the personal data was necessary for intelligence purposes. It is
notable, however, that Catt, just like Wood, was not arrested, let
alone prosecuted or convicted, in relation to any events at the
protests or demonstrations concerned. As noted above, Gross LJ
also cynically observed that, ‘Art. 8 is now a well-travelled area
of our law, perhaps too well-travelled.’52
It would be interesting to know what Gross LJ would make
of the comments of Eady J in R (T and R) v Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis [2012] EWHC 1115 (Admin). T
received a harassment notice from the police after she allegedly
made a homophobic comment to the friend of a neighbour. R
received a similar notice following a complaint from a woman,
Ms A, whom he had previously had a relationship with, who
alleged that he was causing her distress by calling her on the
telephone.
Although dismissing the application for judicial reviewing,
denying the two claimants the ability to have the records of their
harassment notices deleted, on the basis that their retention was
justified, Eady J was confident that Art. 8 ECHR was engaged,
noting that ‘the reach of Article 8 is significantly broader than its
wording would suggest if taken literally . . .’ and therefore, he
thought, encompassed the retention of such quasi-criminality
information.53
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What were the relevant paragraphs of a decision by the
European Court of Human Rights in S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50
that led Eady J to determine so assuredly that the retention of
data by the police would engage Art. 8 ECHR rights, when
Gross LJ was equally certain in Catt that it did not? We must
turn to S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50 in paragraphs at [66]–[67],
where the European Court of Human Rights emphasised that:
‘the concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to
exhaustive definition . . .’ and to learn that Art. 8 ECHR:
. . . covers the physical and psychological integrity of a
person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the
person’s physical and social identity… The mere storing of
data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an
interference within the meaning of Art. 8. The subsequent
use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding.
However, in determining whether the personal information
retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life
aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to
the specific context in which the information at issue has
been recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the
way in which these records are used and processed and the
results that may be obtained.
This author predicts that in the future the UK Supreme Court
will have to deal with a judicial review case which seeks to
determine the issue of whether retention of personal data by a
police authority engages Art. 8 ECHR or not.
It is certainly noteworthy that in his judgment in Catt, Gross
LJ did not refer to S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50, as Eady J did
in T and R. This author feels a UKSC judgment on the issue of
Art. 8 ECHR ‘engagement’ by the retention by the police of
personal data could not be wilfully or mistakenly ignored by the
High Court.
Furthermore, in some judgments since Five Forces, the
accuracy of the data held on the PNC has been challenged in the
context of its being shared.
In the case of C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester
[2010] EWHC 1601, the High Court judge presiding, Langstaff
J, noted approvingly that the wording of the applicant’s data on
the PNC had been amended to make it more accurate, and less
distorting of the allegations made against C; though the primary
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issue in the case was the (un)lawfulness of the allegations about
C being shared.54 This High Court decision was admittedly
overturned in the appeal case of C v Chief Constable of Greater
Manchester [2011] EWCA Civ 175, where the Court of Appeal
determined that the allegations could in fact be shared lawfully,
but there was no suggestion by the Court of Appeal that the
amendment of the language of the entry on the PNC was an
incorrect adjustment of the police records.55
Furthermore, cases decided by the European Court of Human
Rights have suggested that Article 8 ECHR is violated where an
individual is incorrectly labelled as an offender in police records
when they are not actually convicted or they have not even
undergone prosecution.56 This demonstrates that it can be argued
that the retention of police records or ‘criminality information’ in
some form will engage Article 8 ECHR rights to a private life
for an individual, even if this is only where the retention of the
data might perpetuate some inaccuracy or ongoing or lasting
unfairness.
Conclusion
It is suggested that statutory (re)codification of the principles
developed by the High Court, Court of Appeal and so forth on
issues of personal information sharing across criminal justice
organisations in England and Wales would allow for a greater
raising of awareness amongst police authorities, rather than the
steady progression of common law interpretations of a contested
set of statutory provisions. To this end, it is also suggested that
the part-reform of the relevant provisions in the Police Act 1997,
given the introduction of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012,
will not be an entire, comprehensive solution to this lack of
clarity. As noted at the outset of this piece, the Court of Appeal
has very recently determined that the amended provisions of the
Police Act 1997 are incompatible with Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights – which would lend a particular
urgency to reform of the 1997 Act should the Supreme Court
confirm this stance.57
Better than the current framework for inclusion of informa-
tion on ECRCs etc., on a potentially sweeping basis, would be
the kind of semi-rigid, contextualisable frameworks or ‘gate-
ways’ that would allow for the exemption and inclusion of
certain kinds of category of information to be shared in certain
contexts,58 as seen in relation to hearsay and bad character
evidence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provide far
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greater specificity and inherent guidance in statutory inter-
pretation, as noted by Kenneth Parker J, for one.59
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